SMU Law Review
Volume 50

Issue 1

Article 10

January 1997

Ralston Redux: Determining which Section 3 Offerings Are Public
under Section 12(2) after Gustafson
Janet E. Kerr

Recommended Citation
Janet E. Kerr, Ralston Redux: Determining which Section 3 Offerings Are Public under Section 12(2) after
Gustafson, 50 SMU L. REV. 175 (1997)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol50/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

RALSTON REDUX: DETERMINING WHICH
SECTION 3 OFFERINGS ARE PUBLIC
UNDER SECTION

12(2)

AFTER GUSTAFSON
Janet E. Kerr*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................
II. THE FACTS IN GUSTAFSON AND THE COURT'S
APPROA CH ..............................................
A. PRE- GuSTAFSON HISTORY .............................
B . THE FACTS ............................................
C. THE

COURT'S APPROACH TO SECTION

COVERAGE .............

C.

179
181
182

THE PUSH FOR UNIFORM APPLICATION OF
SECTION 10 ...........................................

185

THE INSUPPORTABLE RESULT .........................

187

IV. THE IMPACT OF GUSTAFSON AND THE SEARCH
FOR AN APPROPRIATE TEST .........................
A.

178
178
179

12(2)'s

..............................

III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S ANALYSIS .........
A. RELIANCE ON SECTION 10 .............................
B.

176

THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF USING SECTION

4(2)

189

TO

EXCLUDE SECTION 3 OFFERINGS ......................
B. THE CONCEPT OF "FENDING FOR ONESELF"...........
V . THE TEST ...............................................
A. Two CATEGORIES .....................................
1. Insiders ...........................................
2. Contractually Sophisticated ........................
B. THE A PPLICATION .....................................
VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................

189

193
196
196
196
197
198
199

* Janet E. Kerr, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University Law School. I would like
to thank my research assistants, Steven Cuevas, Jay Wolfson, and Iona DeGuzman.

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

I. INTRODUCTION
ast year, in the seminal case of Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,1 the

United States Supreme Court limited the scope of Section 12(2)2

of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") 3 to include4
only initial public offerings by issuers or their controlling shareholders.
The Court's decision in Gustafson has been widely discussed by many

commentators 5 and has been criticized as poorly reasoned in its basic misunderstanding of the structure, as well as the purpose, of the Securities

Act. 6 As a result of these problems, Gustafson has raised many ques1. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (1995). Following the passage by Congress of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), § 12(2)
was renumbered as § 12(a)(2) and contains the original language of § 12(2). Since many
articles and other reference materials were written prior to this change, including the Gustafson decision, this Article will refer to the section as § 12(2).
3. Section 12(2) provides for damages and rescission. Such relief may be granted to
the buyers of the securities of the transaction in question as long as it can be proven that:
(i) there was a sale of a security; (ii) made through the use of interstate commerce or mails;
(iii) by means of a prospectus or oral communication; (iv) which included an untrue statement or omission of a material fact; and (v) there is the requisite degree of privity between
the plaintiff and defendant. An affirmative defense to the prima facie case is that the seller
did not know of-nor could reasonably have known of-the misstatement or omission. 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1995).
4. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1067. As discussed infra in Part III of this Article, the
Court based its opinion on erroneous statutory interpretations and the application of improper judicial canons. Because of this, the Court's decision does not quite logically reach
its holding; however, the Court's intent to limit § 12(2) to include only public offerings is
clear.
5. For additional comments regarding the Gustafson decision, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 50 Bus. LAW. 1231 (1995);
Dennis J.Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Scope of Section 12(2) After 'Gustafson,' 214 N.Y.
L.J. 5 (1995); Harold S. Bloomenthal, Supreme Court Says Section 12(2) Liability Does Not
Extend to Private Offerings or Secondary Trading (pts. 1 & 2), 17 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep.
25 (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter Bloomenthal, Supreme Court, Part 1], 17 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L.
Rep. 38 (May 1995) [hereinafter Bloomenthal, Supreme Court,Part2]; Ted J. Fiflis, Significant Securities Law Decisions of the Past Year, as of June 14, 1995, CA 36 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 51
(1995) [hereinafter Fiflis, Significant]; Ted J. Fiflis, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc.: Judicial
vs. Legislative Power, 23 SEC. REG. L.J. 423 (1996); Roberta S. Karmel, Curtailing Civil
Liability, 213 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995); Therese H. Maynard, The Impact of Gustafson and Its
Methodology, 24 SEC. REG. L.J. 61 (1996) [hereinafter Maynard, Impact]; Steven Thel,
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV.
1183 (1995); Elliott J.Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.:
What Questions Remain?, 50 Bus. LAW. 1209 (1995); Laura K. Bancroft, Note, Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.: The Continued Shrinking of Private-PlaintiffRemedies Under the 1933 Securities Act, 27 Loy. U. CUH. L.J. 149 (1995); and Note, Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 109 HARV. L. REV. 329 (1995).
6. See Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 62 analyzing the implications of Gustafson
and discussing the lower court decisions that have followed it. ("[T]he methodology used
by the Court to limit the availability of the Section 12(2) express remedy undermines established interpretations of various provisions of the 1933 Act." Id.). See also Weiss, supra
note 5, who agrees with the Court's narrowing of § 12(2) to public offerings of securities,
but disagrees with the way the Court reached its decision: "[Tihe route the Court took to
get [to the decision] strikes me, as it struck the four dissenting Justices, as highly problematic." Weiss, supra note 5, at 1210.
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to undermine previously unchallenged princitions 7 and has threatened
8
ples in securities law.
This Article addresses one of the more important questions following
the Gustafson decision, that is-what public offerings, besides registered
public offerings, are now within the scope of Section 12(2)?9 Because
Gustafson provides little, if any, instruction with respect to this issue, it is
anticipated that the Court will be faced with this question in the near
future. It is the position of this Article that the concept of being able to
"fend for oneself," as developed by the Court forty-three years ago in
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.,1° should be used as the determinative principle in answering this question. 1
Since many authors have written about the Gustafson decision, this Article provides only a brief discussion of the facts and the Court's approach
to defining Section 12(2)'s coverage. The balance of the Article focuses
on the Court's problematic analysis in Gustafson, the consequences of
that analysis, and the search for, and creation of, a new test based on the
7. As well as the question raised by this Article, some other questions were left unaddressed by the Gustafson decision. For one example, see Weiss, supra note 5, at 1225,
stating that "the three most important such questions" are: (i) the status, with regard to
§ 12(2), of a "failed" statutory private offering; (ii) whether free writing constitutes a prospectus for purposes of § 12(2); and (iii) the computation of damages in a § 12(2) action.
See also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1231-32, raising the question of whether oral communications made in connection with private placements give rise to § 12(2) liability. Since
the scope of this Article is narrow, one should make particular reference to the articles by
Bainbridge and Weiss, as well as to articles by the other commentators for further discussion of these issues. See supra note 5. For other implications raised by Gustafson, see
Bruce Angiolillo, 'Gustafson': Section 12(2) Applies Only to IPOs, 213 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1995);
Glenn M. Reiter & Gregory W. Conway, Due Diligence in Offerings by Non-U.S. Issuers,
in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1995, at 95 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 897, 1995); and Margaret A. Bancroft, Responding to Gustafson:
Company Registration and a New Negligence Standard, 9 INSIiHrs 14 (July 1995).
8. Professor Fiflis observes that the Gustafson opinion has created uncertainty in that
"there are few reliable points of reference in the securities laws and it's anyone's guess as
to what lower courts will do, given their new license to forego traditions." Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 66. See also Professor Maynard observing the Gustafson case fallout
upon its one-year anniversary, stating that "further challenges of the federal securities laws
are likely to face the federal courts, threatening to further unsettle securities law and practice" and adding later that:
[T]he flawed reasoning of the Gustafson opinion will lead to more litigation
as the lower courts are asked to revisit established understandings of other
provisions of the 1933 Act. While the Gustafson opinion can be viewed as a
rather crude effort by the Supreme Court to engage in securities litigation
reform, by narrowing the scope of section 12(2) and thus narrowing the
scope of securities fraud cases brought in federal courts, the ultimate irony is
that the Court's opinion may actually yield even more litigation.
Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 62-63 & n.7.
9. Other authors have also raised this as an issue. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at
1260, stating that "the majority limited section 12(2) to an undefined class of transactions
called public offerings. Unfortunately, the majority failed to clarify which transactions fall
within that class or even how that determination is to be made." See also Fiflis, Significant,
supra note 5, at 66, stating that "the Court made no mention of how to define a 'public
offering."' See generally Weiss, supra note 5, at 1220-26.
10. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
11. See infra note 92 for other commentators which mention the importance of revisiting Ralston Purina.
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Ralston Purinacase's "self-fending" concept for ascertaining which Section 3 offerings are public and which are private with respect to Section
12(2).
II. THE FACTS IN GUSTAFSON AND THE
COURT'S APPROACH
A. PRE-GUSTAFSON HISTORY
Prior to Gustafson, it had been well-settled law that Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act applied to both private and public offerings in the distribution stage.12 Additionally, for many years, it had been generally understood that Section 12(2) also applied to secondary market
transactions. 13 However, a circuit split arose in 1991 between the Third
and Seventh Circuits which called into question both of these applications
of Section 12(2).14 As a result of this split, and because of Section 12(2)'s
12. The U.S. Supreme Court had implicitly extended § 12(2) to secondary market
transactions in several previous cases. As Professor Bainbridge points out, the Court considered the arbitrability of claims arising under § 12(2) of the Securities Act in both Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) and Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989). Both of these cases involved secondary market transactions and the
Court assumed without question that § 12(2) applied. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428; Rodriguez de
Quijas, 490 U.S. at 478-79. Professor Bainbridge similarly states that the Court, in a case
very similar to Gustafson, applied § 12(2) without reservation to a private transaction.
Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 703-04 (1985) (addressing the applicability of the sale
of business doctrine within the context of a private sale). Bainbridge,supranote 5, at 1233.
See also Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 983
(3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Loss, FUNDAMENTALS] ("To start with what is clearest, [§ 12(2)]
applies to all sales of securities, whether or not registered and whether or not the particular
security or transaction is exempted from § 5, with one exception: Securities exempted
under § 3(a)(2) .. " Id. (citations omitted)). Professor John Coffee stated: "Currently, it
is clear beyond argument that § 12(2) applies to private placements." John C. Coffee, Jr.,
A Statutory and Case Law Primer on Due Diligence Under the Federal Securities Law, in
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE 1995, at 11 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 886, 1995). See also MARC STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 594 (2d ed.
1993).

13. A secondary market transaction, defined in its broadest context, is a transaction

made on behalf of some person or company other than the original issuer and can include
the sale of securities by control persons. 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 6.03 (1996). The principal commentators agreeing with the
application of § 12(2) to secondary market transactions include Louis Loss, The Assault on
Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 908, 917 (1992) [hereinafter Loss, Assault];
Louis Loss, Securities Act, Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAW. 47 (1992) [hereinafter
Loss, Rebuttal]; Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 for FraudulentTrading in PostdistributionMarkets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 847, 849
(1991); Therese H. Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. REV.
817, 822 (1994). See also Kevin N. Peter, Comment, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933: Does It Apply to the Secondary Market? The Circuits are Fighting,31 Hous. L. REV.
1205 (1994). Examples of commentators arguing to limit the scope of § 12(2) are Robert
A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary Market?, 55 ALB. L.
REV. 97 (1991); Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section 12(2)
Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. LAW. 1 (1992). Many lower court decisions have
held that § 12(2) applies to secondary transactions; however, more have held that it does
not. See Bancroft, supra note 5, at 153-54 nn.32-33 for a list of court decisions falling on
both sides of the issue.
14. Compare Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 582 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 1146 (1994) (holding § 12(2) applies to all sales of stock)
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decided to make a
newly increased popularity in recent years, the Court
15
final determination of the scope of Section 12(2).
B. THE FACTS

Briefly, Gustafson involved investors (the "plaintiffs") who had
purchased all of the outstanding shares of Alloyd Co., Inc. ("Alloyd")
from the controlling stockholders of Alloyd (the "defendants"). 1 6 The
sale of these shares was not made through a public offering, but rather
through a private written contract of sale.' 7 The plaintiffs negotiated with
the defendants to include certain warranties and representations in the
contract. Following the sale, the plaintiffs alleged the warranties and rep-

resentations18 relating to the financial condition of Alloyd were untrue
and that the written contract was a "prospectus" for purposes of Section
12(2) of the Securities Act. 19 The plaintiffs sought the remedy of rescis20
sion of the contract as provided by this section.

C.

THE COURT'S APPROACH TO SECTION

12(2)'s

COVERAGE

In commencing with the analysis of Section 12(2)'s scope, the Court
turned to the phrase "by means of a prospectus or oral communication,"
and decided that the term "prospectus" was the focal point in determining Section 12(2)'s coverage. 2 1 The Court determined that the answer
depended on the statutory interpretation of this term.22 Even though the
with Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 820 (1991) (narrowing § 12(2) to only initial public offerings). See also Bainbridge,
supra note 5, at 1234.
15. Professor Bainbridge gives a lengthy discussion of the advantages of § 12(2) over
§ 11 of the Securities Act and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Among
other things, he mentions the following: (1) Section 12(2)'s remedy of rescission may be
more beneficial to the plaintiff than § 11 and Rule 10b-5's limitation to actual damages, see
Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693 (comparing § 12(2) and Rule 10b-5 and noting that the remedy of
rescission in § 12(2) is often viewed as necessary in order to compensate plaintiffs who
have been defrauded in initial security distributions); (2) causation and reliance need not
be proven in § 12(2) as compared to a Rule 10b-5 case, where they are prima facie elements, and § 11, where they are affirmative defenses; and (3) scienter (or reckless disregard) is a prima facie element of Rule 10b-5, whereas the defendant's mental state is not
relevant to the plaintiff's case in § 12(2) and appears only as the affirmative defense of
reasonable care. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1233-34 (citing Loss, Assault, supra note
13, at 908, 911). An additional reason that § 12(2) has grown in popularity is the Supreme
Court's decision in Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994),
which limited aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5. Following this case, many
litigants had to sue under § 12(2). Another reason for § 12(2)'s popularity has been advanced by Professor Thel. Professor Thel posited that § 12(2) became increasingly popular
as a result of Rule 10b-5's scope becoming narrowed over the last 20 years, while § 12(2)'s
coverage (prior to Gustafson) had remained unchanged. If § 12(2) was not likewise narrowed, then the effort to do so with respect to Rule 10b-5 would be nullified. Thel, supra
note 5, at 1192-93.
16. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064.
17. Id. at 1065.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1066.
22. Id.
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Court recognized that there were several sections of the Securities Act
that included the term prospectus, such as Section 10,23 Section 2(10),24
and Section 12,25 it selected Section 10 as the interpretative section on
26
which to base its analysis.

Having done this, the Court noted Section 10's use of the term "prospectus" and stated that "a prospectus ... shall contain the information
contained in a registration statement. '2 7 In order to apply Section 10 to
Section 12(2), the Court observed that uniformity within the Act was
called for, and therefore, determined that the term "prospectus" had the

same meaning throughout the Act.2 8 As a result, Section 12(2) would
only apply to those documents containing such information as required
by Section 10.29 As a result, the Court held that the private sales contract
in the case was not a prospectus under Section 10 because the law did not
require these contracts to contain all the information in a registration
statement. 30 Thus, since the contract was not a "prospectus" for purposes
23. Section 10 of the 1933 Act provides in part:
Except to the extent otherwise permitted or required pursuant to this subsection or subsections (c), (d), or (e) of this section(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a
foreign government or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information contained in the registration statement...;
(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or
political subdivision thereof shall contain the information contained in the
registration statement....
15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
24. Section 2(10) defines prospectus as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale or confirms the sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (1994).
25. Section 12(2) provides in pertinent part:
(a) In general
Any person who-(2) offers or sells a security ...by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such
untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable ... to the person purchasing such security from him ...[for]
the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon . . .or for

damages....
15 U.S.C. § 771(n)(2) (1995).
26. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1066-67.
27. Id. at 1066 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77j), The Court noted that "[a]lthough § 10 does
not define what a prospectus is, it does instruct us what a prospectus cannot be." Id. at
1066-67.
28. Id. at 1067. The Court's push for uniformity is most apparent in its statement that
"the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in
which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout." Id.
29. Id.

30. Id. at 1073-74. The Court stated that "a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders," id. at 1067,
and concluded that this contract did not fall into that category of document. Id. at 1074.

1996]

RALSTON RED UX

of Section 10, it was not one under Section 12(2) either. 31

In the process of reaching its holding, the Court equivocated. Even
though it concluded that Section 10 provided the interpretation for "prospectus" for the entire Securities Act, the Court noted that Section 10 in
fact did not apply to all prospectuses. 32 The Court observed that Section
were exempt from compliance with the Act, including Section
3 offerings
10.33 In recognition of this, the Court carved out an exception and held
"that a document is not a prospectus ...if, absent an exemption, it need
not comply with § 10's requirements in the first place."'34 The Court,

however, downplayed this exception by stating that "whatever else 'prospectus' may mean, the term is confined to a document that, absent an
overriding exemption, must include the 'information contained in the registration statement."' 35 The Court opined that public offerings require
the preparation and filing of a registration statement, and based on that,

concluded "that a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents'36 related
to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders.
Regardless of the Court's attempt to declare a uniform definition, the

holding recognizes that the term "prospectus," for the purposes of Section 12(2), embraces at least two types of documents: (1) those documents that include the information required to be contained in a

registration statement, and thus are used in connection with registered
with offerpublic offerings; and (2) those documents used in connection
37
ings to the public made pursuant to Section 3 of the Act.
III.

PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Only a brief discussion of the Court's analysis and the key points of the
dissenting opinions in Gustafson is provided in this section, since previous
31. Id. at 1068. Implicit in this statement is the belief that the contract did not fall into
the "overriding exemption" language discussed infra note 71 and accompanying text.
32. Id. at 1066.
33. Id. The Court stated: "Save for the explicit and well-defined exemptions for securities listed under § 3, see 15 U.S.C. § 77c (exempting certain classes of securities from
the coverage of the Act), [§ 10's] mandate is unqualified: 'a prospectus ... shall contain
the information contained in the registration statement."' Id. Since § 3 offerings are exempted from the coverage of the Act (except for their express inclusion under § 12(2)),
then they are also exempted from the registration provisions of § 5. Therefore, these offerings need not comply with § 10 of the Act.
34. Id. at 1067. The "absent an exemption language," when read in conjunction with
the preceding paragraph in the opinion, refers to exemptions under § 3. See Weiss, supra
note 5, at 1214 n.26. See also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
35. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1067 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
36. Id.
37. The first category of prospectus would also include those documents that are arguably required to comply with § 10, but for some reason fail to do so. See Bainbridge,
supra note 5, at 1238. In regard to this, the Court stated that this "does not mean that a
document ceases to be a prospectus whenever it omits a required piece of information."
Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1067. But see infra note 68 and accompanying text discussing that
this statement is ambiguous since it leaves unclear when a document that omits a required
piece of information nonetheless qualifies as a prospectus.
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articles have devoted ample coverage. 38 For the most part, criticisms of
the Court's decision emphasize two major errors upon which the Court
based its analysis. First, the Court's reliance on Section 10 for its interpretation of the term "prospectus" was incorrect. Second, the Court exacerbated this error by wrongly assuming that this interpretation should
uniformly apply throughout the Act, including Section 12(2). Both of
these errors resulted from the Court's lack of understanding and/or disre39
gard for the statutory framework of the Act.
A.

RELIANCE ON SECTION 10

With respect to the Court's first error, Section 2, not Section 10, is the
recognized definitional section of the Securities Act.40 Therefore, the selection of Section 10 was in violation of the well-established judicial rule
38. See supra note 5 for a list of articles which provide a critique of the Court's analysis and discussion of the dissenting opinions. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
with Justices Thomas and Ginsburg writing separate dissenting opinions. Those Justices
comprising the majority, besides Justice Kennedy, were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Souter. Those Justices joining Justice Thomas in his dissent
were Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Breyer also joined Justice Ginsburg in
her separate dissenting opinion. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1064.
39. Some articles have surmised that the Court had a pre-determined goal to narrow
§ 12(2)'s application to include only public offerings and selected § 10, which uses the term
"prospectus" in the most "restrictive sense," to serve that end. See Bainbridge, supra note
5, at 1236; Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 63. See generally Thel, supra note 5, at 1183,
and Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 64, in agreement that the Court was determined to
narrow § 12(2). Justice Thomas noted that the majority, in making its decision, considered
the public policy ramifications of § 12(2)'s application to all types of offerings in disregard
of the legislative history and established statutory intent of this section. Justice Thomas
stated:
The majority is concerned that a contrary reading would have a drastic impact on the thousands of private and secondary transactions by imposing new
liabilities and new transaction costs. But the majority forgets that we are
only enforcing Congress' decision to impose such standards of conduct and
remedies upon sellers. If the majority believes that § 12(2)'s requirements
are too burdensome for the securities markets, it must rely upon other
branches of government to limit the 1933 Act.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court implicitly admitted its
intentions to narrow § 12(2) when it stated:
It is not plausible to infer that Congress created this extensive liability for
every casual communication between buyer and seller in the secondary market. It is often difficult, if not altogether impractical, for those engaged in
casual communications not to omit some fact that would, if included, qualify
the accuracy of a statement. Under Alloyd's view any casual communication
between buyer and seller in the aftermarket could give rise to an action for
rescission, with no evidence of fraud on the part of the seller or reliance on
the part of the buyer.
Id. at 1071.
40. Professor Bainbridge noted that "prospectus is a defined term under the Act, specifically section 2(10) thereof." Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1235. Professor Fiflis pointed
this out, stating:
The major sin of the [Gustafson] opinion is that in construing the word "prospectus" in § 12(2) it began not by referring to § 2(10), which defines that
term, but with § 10, which uses the term to indicate what a prospectus must
contain to satisfy § 5, the registration and prospectus delivery requirement.
Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 63. See also Weiss, supra note 5, at 1213-16 for similar
criticism.

1996]

RALSTON RED UX

of construction that "when one sets out to define a term; it is the definition section of an act that should be first consulted." ' 41 Surprisingly, the
Court conceded that Section 10 is not the definitional section for the term
"prospectus," and vigorously denied it was using it in such a way. 42 Yet
regardless of this hollow protestation, the Court's reliance on this section

and upon no other for its interpretation of the term "prospectus" was
demonstrated when it concluded that Section 10's "mandate is unqualishall contain the information contained in the regisfied: 'a prospectus..,
' 43
tration statement.'
It was only after the Court concluded that Section 10 was the determi-

native section to be used that it referred to Section 2(10). The Court's
only purpose for referring to Section 2(10) was to argue that it did not
41. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, noted the error by saying that "[instead of beginning at the beginning, by first attending to the definition section, the Court ... proceeds
backward; it reads into the literally and logically prior definition section, § 2(10), the meaning 'prospectus' has in § 10." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The
Court in prior cases had observed the importance of starting with the definitional section
of acts. Justice Thomas pointed this out in his dissent in Gustafson and criticized the Court
for "turning to sources outside the four corners of the statute [in order to interpret the
word 'prospectus'] rather than adopting the definition provided by Congress." Gustafson,
115 S. Ct. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For an example, see Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[tihe starting point in every case involving
construction of a statute is the language itself")). Professor Bainbridge argues that if the
Court was determined not to look at § 2(10), then § 5 of the Act, which also contains the
word prospectus, may have been a better choice since the registration process was created
by § 5 and this process, as he explains, is the "very core of the Act: 'All the other provisions of the Act serve merely to implement § 5."' Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1241 (quoting Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 384 (3d ed. 1989)).
In contrast ... section 10 is of relatively minor importance in the statutory
scheme. In particular, the majority overlooked the fact that section 10 is not
self-executing; it merely sets forth the information that must be contained in
a prospectus in order to avoid violating section 5(b)(1). Starting with section
10 thus puts the cart before the horse.
Id.
42. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. The Court emphatically declared that it was not
using § 10 as a definitional section when it denied making "the mistake of treating § 10 as a
definitional section." Id. Regardless, this is exactly what the Court did. Professor Weiss
states that
[The Court's] reasoning seems to be that only those documents that the Act
requires to meet the requirements of section 10 (or that are exempt from
those requirements by reason of section 3) qualify as prospectuses for purposes of section 12(2). In this sense, at least, the Court clearly treats section
10 as definitional in nature.
Weiss, supra note 5, at 1214. Professor Bainbridge concurs stating:
One definition of 'definition' is 'sharp demarcation of outlines or limits.' Is
that not an apt description of the purpose for which Justice Kennedy employed section 10? By limiting the definition of prospectus to the meaning
he believes is contemplated by section 10, he effectively makes section 10 the
working definition of a prospectus.
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1239 (citing WEBSTER's NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 334 (1987)).
43. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77c) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
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conflict with Section 10.44 Section 2(10), which is much broader than Section 10, appears to define the term "prospectus" as including all written
communications that offer a security for sale or confirming its sale. 45 The
Court, however, ignored the plain meaning of this section and applied
several judicial canons in order to narrow its scope, and to bring it within
seeming conformity with Section 10.46 Based on the application of these
canons, the Court concluded that the term "prospectus" was a "term of

art" and a communication
"of wide dissemination" and in general, a
' 47
"public communication.

44. Justice Thomas observed that the majority discussed § 2(10) only "to show that it
does not utterly preclude [the majority's] preferred meaning." Id. at 1079. See also Justice
Ginsburg's statement that "[t]he Court then proceeds backward; it reads into the literally
and logically prior definition section, § 2(10), the meaning 'prospectus' has in § 10." Id. at
1080.
45. Section 2(10) defines "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale or confirms the sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(10) (1994). Section 2(10)
exempts from the term prospectus certain communications (such as free writing and tombstone ads). Id. See infra note 49 for more discussion.
46. The Court first applied a canon that refused to read some of the language in
§ 2(10) as redundant and stated:
If"communication" included every written communication, it would render
"notice, circular, advertisement, [and] letter" redundant, since each of these
are forms of written communication as well. Congress with ease could have
drafted § 2(10) to read: "The term 'prospectus' means any communication,
written or by radio or television, that offers a security for sale or confirms the
sale of a security." Congress did not write the statute that way, however, and
we decline to say it included the words "notice, circular, advertisement, [and]
letter" for no purpose.
Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1069. The second canon employed by the majority to narrow
§ 2(10)'s definition of a prospectus was noscitur a sociis. "This doctrine stands for the
belief that a word is known by the company it keeps." Id. Applying this canon, the Court
observed that, with the exception of communication, all of the words in § 2(10) refer to
"documents of wide dissemination." Id.
Professor Bainbridge argues that these two canons were applied in error. Bainbridge,
supra note 5, at 1248-50. He explains that application of the first canon ignored that redundancies clearly do in fact exist in the Securities Act, citing for example the definition of a
security which "contains a long list of instruments, and concludes with the phrase or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Id. at 1249. With
respect to the second canon, Bainbridge argues that the word "letter" is not a document of
wide dissemination and, in fact, only the term prospectus "clearly relates only to public
offerings." Id. Therefore, the canon of "noscitura sociis is offset by the canon that 'general terms are to receive a general construction."' Id. at 1249 n.124 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 404 (1950) [hereinafter Llewellyn,
Remarks]). For a critical discussion of the erroneous application of these judicial canons to
§ 2(10), see Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1248-50. See also Justice Thomas explaining that
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis should only be employed where ambiguity exists, adding
"which I do not find in § 2(10)." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1075 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1070. In order to make the term "prospectus" more susceptible to the Court's interpretation as a communication to the public, it labeled it as a
"term of art." The Court opined that "the term 'written communication' must be read in
context to refer to writings that, from a functional standpoint, are similar to the terms
'notice, circular, [and] advertisement."' Id.
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THE PUSH FOR UNIFORM APPLICATION OF SECTION 10

After mistakenly relying on Section 10, the Court committed its second
error by selecting the incorrect judicial canon of interpretation, which

presumes that "all terms in an act have the same meaning. ' 48 Based on
established rules of judicial construction, when a word within a statute
has different meanings, and the meaning in one context is unsuitable in
another, the statutory intent must be honored and the presumption of
uniformity disregarded. 49 The Securities Act on its face clearly reveals
kinds of documents as prospectuses, 50 a fact
that it contemplates different
51
which the majority knew.

The illogic of the Court's reliance on Section 10 and its application to
Section 12(2) is revealed when the Court inevitably dealt with Section
48. Id. at 1067. The Court noted that § 12(2) must be considered in light of § 10 in
order to promote a uniform interpretation of "prospectus" throughout the Act. Id. at
1066-67.
49. Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing NationsBank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 816 (1995)). See also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1237
("If the majority set out to restrict prospectus to its narrowest meaning, coupling this canon with section 10 may have appeared to be the simplest way of doing so.").
50. The Act expressly refers to numerous documents that are prospectuses for the
purpose of the Act, but which are not required to contain the information of a registration
statement. Such documents are: (1) preliminary and summary prospectuses authorized by
§ 10(b); (2) documents used in connection with registered public offerings which violate
§ 5(b)(1) of the Act (which prohibits the transmission of a prospectus that does not comply
with § 10, such as confirmations and free writing that are not exempted by §8 2(10)(a) or
2(10)(b) of the Act); and (3) documents used in § 3 offerings. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at
1238.
51. The majority, however, conceded that the term "prospectus" has multiple definitions, as Professor Bainbridge notes, "[tihe majority opinion appears to contemplate at
least three classes of documents that fall within the definition of prospectus: (i) documents
that comply with section 10; (ii) documents that are required to comply with section 10, but
fail to do so; and (iii) documents that are exempted from compliance with section 10."
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1238. Therefore, the Court conceded § 10's non-exclusivity,
yet attempted at the same time to argue for its uniform application. The minority also
noted that the manifest intent of Congress is that the term "prospectus" be given different
meanings. Justice Ginsburg observed that in "the Investment Company Act of 1940, Congress explicitly recognized that the Securities Act uses 'prospectus' in two different
senses-one in § 10, and another in the rest of the Act." Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1080
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agreed that the wrong canon was applied and
observed, "there are several indications that Congress did not use the word 'prospectus' in
the same sense throughout the statute," such as the inclusion within § 2(10)'s definition of
"prospectus" of confirmation slips, which do not contain most of the information required
by § 10. Id. at 1076. See also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1237 (quoting Llewellyn, Remarks, supra note 46, at 404 n.49 ("This presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary to assign different meanings to make the statute consistent.")). Bainbridge argues that
the Court did not apply the correct canon. Id. at 1237-39. One proof of the untenable
application of § 10 as an all encompassing definition is that it leaves a key issue unresolved-whether free writing and other selling documents used in connection with a registered offering fall within the term "prospectus" for § 12(2) purposes. Discussion of this
issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. It does serve to demonstrate, though,
that § 10 can only be applied so far, and no matter how intent the Court was in arguing for
its uniform application, it is literally impossible to do so. For a discussion of the issues left
open by Gustafson, see Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1258-60, and Weiss, supra note 5, at
1226-27, as well as other sources cited supra notes 5 and 7.
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12(2)'s express inclusion of Section 3 offerings.52 As mentioned previously, Section 3 offerings are exempted from all other sections of the Act,
including Section 10.53 In light of this inclusion, two results of the Court's
analysis become apparent: (1) the term prospectus, as found in Section
12(2), contemplates a broader meaning than that found in Section 10; and
(2) concomitant with this outcome, Section 10, by its own terms, can only
be used to define one type of "prospectus" for Section 12(2) purposes
(those used in registered offerings), thus leaving the term undefined for
offerings made pursuant to Section 3.
With respect to this dilemma, the Court had no other choice than to
implicitly admit that the term "prospectus" must have another meaning
than that under Section 10. This concession is demonstrated when the
Court fashioned an exception to Section 10's uniform application: "A
document is not a prospectus ... if, absent an exemption [under Section
'5 4
3], it need not comply with § 10's requirements in the first place."
The Court weakly asserted that any apparent conflict between Section
12(2)'s and Section 10's usage of the term prospectus does not exist. As
authority for this, the Court observed that Section 12(2) exempted from
its coverage Section 3 offerings which involved the sale of government
issued securities, 55 and argued that this exemption provided proof that
Section 12(2) did not cover misrepresentations made in all written communications. 56 The Court argued that if Congress had intended to create
such coverage under Section 12(2), then it would not have provided an
exemption for government-issued securities. 57 As a result, the Court concluded that any conflicting interpretation of "prospectus" disappears if
the term is limited "only to documents that offer securities sold to the
public by an issuer."'58 The Court further stated that "[t]he exemption for
government issued securities makes perfect sense on that view, for it then
becomes a precise and appropriate means of giving immunity to govern' 59
mental authorities.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (1995) (applying the provision to securities "whether or
not exempted by the provisions of Section 77c").
53. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
54. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067. With regard to this exception, Professor Fiflis
observed:
As stated, the majority reaches its result by construing the term "prospectus" in § 12(2) to mean the full preliminary or final prospectus required by
§ 10 for registered offerings. However, Justice Kennedy recognized that
§ 12(2) expressly applies to offerings exempted from registration by § 3 (and
hence from the prospectus delivery requirements of § 5) other than for government and bank securities exempted by § 3(a)(2). He therefore is forced
to conclude that § 12(2) applies if a § 10 prospectus is required for the sale,
or would have been required but for the § 3 exemption, except for offerings
exempted by § 3(a)(2).
Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 62.
55. Section 3(a)(2) is found in 15 U.S.C. § 77a(2) (1994).
56. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1068.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.

RALSTON REDUX

1996]

The Court's reliance on Section 3(a)(2) as indicative of something

more than what it clearly states is questionable at best. As Justice
Thomas observed in his dissenting opinion, one could reasonably argue
the opposite position-that when Congress excluded Section 3(a)(2) from
Section 12(2) to
Section 12(2), it had the chance of specifically narrowing
60
include only public offerings, but did not do so.
C.

THE INSUPPORTABLE RESULT

When all of the Court's arguments are reviewed, one thing becomes

painfully evident-in its attempt to narrow Section 12(2) to include only
public offerings, the Court did not understand (or ignored) the nature of
these offerings and, consequently, how to define them.6 1 This crucial mis-

60. Justice Thomas reasoned that the express exemption (§ 3(a)(2)) only excluded this
type of offering from the reach of § 12(2) and did not indicate a broader exclusion. Id. at
1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that if Congress intended such a
limitation for all private or secondary transactions then Congress would have expressly
stated such, or the exemption for government securities would have included those types of
offerings. Id. Professor Bloomenthal commented upon the majority's argument concerning § 3(a)(2): "This is such rank speculation that if the rules of evidence were applicable to
such testimony, it would probably not be admittable." See Bloomenthal, Supreme Court,
Part I, supra note 5, at 26.
61. It is interesting to note that it was only after the Court rendered its conclusion as
to the scope of § 12(2) that it examined the original purposes of the 1933 Act. The Court
observed that Congress's primary purpose in passing the Act was the creation of federal
duties or requirements involving the registration and disclosure obligations for public offerings. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. The Court cited to several cases which observed that
the 1933 Act affected public or initial offerings of securities: United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 (1975); SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 122 n.5 (1953). Having observed this, the Court concluded that the 1933 Act
provided remedies only for violations of these requirements. The Court intentionally ignored that the primary purpose language was non-exclusive, and even conceded this when
it stated, "[it is more reasonable to interpret the liability provisions of the 1933 Act as
designed for the primary purpose of providing remedies for violations of the obligations it
had created." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1068. Thus, the Court ignored the equally important
non-exclusionary thrust of other purposes of the Act. With regard to this, Professor Loss
stated:
[1Ironically from my point of view, several courts have quoted the opening
paragraph of my discussion elsewhere of the statutory pattern of the 1933
Act:
The 1933 Act is concerned primarily with distributions. Postdistribution
trading was to be the subject of further legislation, which turned out to be the
1934 Act.
Having thus set the terms of the discourse, some courts (along with Professor Weiss) have overlooked, or at any rate ignored, the word "primarily,"
without which the quoted paragraph would be inaccurate.
Loss, Rebuttal, supra note 13, at 55-56.
Additionally, Professor Loss asserts that these courts ignored the prefatory language to
his discussion of § 12(2): "To start with what is clearest, the section applies to all sales of
securities." Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 12, at 1021. For further support of this
assertion, see Bancroft, supra note 5, at 152 (quoting President Roosevelt when he referred
to the Securities Act of 1933 as ensuring that "'every issue of new securities... [would] be
accompanied by full publicity and information' with the burden of truthful disclosure on
those that issued securities"). Additionally, Justice Ginsburg cites William 0. Douglas and
George E. Bates, who noted shortly after the passage of the Securities Act that § 12(2)
would apply to all material untrue statements or omissions, whether or not the security was
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understanding is apparent from the Court's first attempt to define all
public offerings as those that are registered; the Court thus embraced
Section 10 to conform to this understanding. However, contrary to the
Court's interpretation, not all public offerings are registered, 62 a fact

which is well known in securities law.
The Court manifested its confusion again when, faced with the possible

conflict between Section 10 and Section 2(10) and the inapplication of
Section 10 to Section 3 offerings, it proffered the generic definition of

"prospectus" as: A "public communication" involving a "document of
wide dissemination. ' 63 This definition directly opposes long-standing authority that public offerings are not necessarily defined by the number of

participants

and,

thus, neither by the

number of documents

disseminated.64

Besides the Court being off-base in its rudimentary understanding of
these basic securities law concepts, it is clear that it did not anticipate the
anomalous consequences of its decision. If it had, it would have realized
that, for the purpose of Section 3 offerings, an issuer could easily circumvent Section 12(2) by limiting the dissemination of documents to a few
registered. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1082 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing William 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 177
(1933)).
The Court also relied on § 17(a) of the 1933 Act to support its narrow interpretation of
§ 12(2), noting that 17(a) covered not only public offerings, but also other types of offerings since it did not contain the limiting words "by means of prospectus or oral communications." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071 (citing United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768
(1979), in which the Court interpreted § 17(a) of the Act to cover all types of offerings). In
the alternative, Professor Loss explains that §§ 12(2) and 17(a) are comparable: "The
scope of liability under Section 12(2) and 17(a), the [Act's] two antifraud Sections, is substantially the same. In effect, Section 12(2) is to Section 17(a) what Section 12(1) is to
Section 5." See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1245 (quoting Loss, Assault, supra note 13, at
915).
The Court also misinterpreted the legislative history of § 12(2) by misconstruing provisions relating to § 11 with § 12(2). For a further discussion of this point, see Bloomenthal,
Supreme Court, Part I, supra note 5, at 29-31.
62. This misunderstanding was revealed by the Court when it incorrectly observed that
the preparation and filing of a registration statement is generally required only for a public
offering of a security, and concluded that "a prospectus under § 10 is confined to documents relating to public offerings by an issuer or its controlling shareholders." Gustafson,
115 S.Ct. at 1067. This is erroneous when one considers that a public offering can embrace
offerings that are non-registered, and thus not required to comply with § 10. See infra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text. This misinterpretation leaves open the question of
which non-registered public offerings are included within the scope of § 12(2).
63. Gustafson, 115 S.Ct. at 1070.
64. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. See also Fiflis, Significant,supra note
5, at 66 (quoting Viscount Sumner's dictum in Nash v. Lynde (1929) A.C. 158, 169: "'The
public' . . . is of course a general word. No particular numbers are prescribed. Anything
from two to infinity may serve: perhaps even one, if he is intended to be the first of a series
of subscribers, but makes further proceedings needless by himself subscribing the whole").
See also Ralston Purina, 345 U.S. at 125 ("the statute would seem to apply to a 'public
offering' whether to few or many"); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 467 (2d Cir.
1959) ("we think that the Ralston Purina case clearly rejected a quantity limit"). In Gilligan, the court held that the offering to the four persons was public. Gilligan, 267 F.2d at
467.
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persons. 65 Automatically treating such offerings as private, and therefore
excluded, flies in the face of well-established authority that offerings involving only a few individuals (and/or entities) can still be public. 66 An
equally anomalous result flows from the opposite situation. A Section 3
offering involving the wide dissemination of a prospectus would be automatically treated as public and included within Section 12(2), even though

the nature of the offering itself may be considered private. 67 Because
both of these outcomes are so heretical when compared with established

securities law and practice, such a definition cannot be seriously followed.
Needless to say, the focus on documents and their dissemination is im-

perfect, if not wrong altogether. The only sure conclusion that can be
reached from Gustafson is that registered public offerings are covered by
Section 12(2). As to any Section 3 offerings, the intent of the Court is
clear-they must be public in order to be included within Section 12(2).68
IV. THE IMPACT OF GUSTAFSON AND THE SEARCH FOR
AN APPROPRIATE TEST
A.

THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF USING SECTION

SECTION

3

4(2)

TO EXCLUDE

OFFERINGS

It has been suggested that the starting point in defining a public offering should begin with what it is not. 69 Based on this, one conclusion may
65. Such an easy loophole serves as an invitation for fraud and renders § 12(2) toothless. This could conceivably even embrace an offering to a large group of shareholders as
long as only a few within the group receive a prospectus.
66. For example, Rule 504 of Regulation D, § 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 are regarded as
public offerings since there can be an unlimited number of investors in these offerings. The
fact that only a few investors are offered securities in one of these offerings would not
generally change the public nature of the offering, since investors need not meet stringent
qualification requirements. There are no investor qualifications under Rule 504, and only
a minimal investor requirement that offerees and purchasers be residents of the state of the
offering for purposes of Rule 147 and § 3(a)(11). See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1266
("they are all usually regarded as public").
67. For example, Rule 506 of Regulation D, which contains no requirement limiting
the number of accredited investors, is the safe harbor to § 4(2) for private placements.
Thus, offerings made pursuant thereto are deemed non-public. In light of this, if the dissemination of documents controls and documents are given to a large number of accredited investors (making the offering public under this definition), express statutory intent
that the offering be considered private is nullified.
68. Even after conceding that § 12(2) included § 3 offerings and the inapplicability of
§ 10 to these offerings, the Court still insisted that "prospectus" has the same meaning in
§ 12(2) as it does in § 10. "[P]rospectus under § 10 is confined to documents related to a
public offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067
(emphasis added). Professor Bainbridge raised the possibility that Gustafson included all
§ 3 offerings within § 12(2), and therefore any document used in connection therewith
would automatically be a prospectus covered by § 12(2)-whether or not the offering was
public. Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1260-65. Professor Bainbridge, however, argued
against adoption of this interpretation because it would go against the intent of the Court's
opinion to include only public offerings within § 12(2)'s scope. Id. at 1264-65. See also
Weiss, supra note 5, at 1220 (arguing that not all § 3 offerings are subject to § 12(2)).
69. It has been posited that a public offering begins with the definition of a private
offering, and through negative inference the definition is formed. In contrast to private
offerings, in which the sale of securities occurs through a private agreement, a public offering is commonly accomplished through the use of securities exchanges or through broker-
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be readily advanced-those offerings that rely on the Section 4(2) exemption of the Securities Act are deemed private offerings and, therefore, any
private placement documents used pursuant thereto would not be cov-

ered by Section 12(2). In agreement with this are the lower court cases
that have followed Gustafson
and uniformly excluded these offerings
70
from Section 12(2)'s scope.

Yet the exclusion of these offerings from Section 12(2) should not be
taken for something more than it is-an imprimatur for determining
which other unregistered offerings are private, and therefore, not covered
under Section 12(2). Put simply, Section 4(2) offerings are excluded from
Section 12(2)'s scope for no other reason than by virtue of the Court's
"absent an overriding exemption" language in Gustafson, which expressly
includes within Section 12(2) only those offerings that are exempted
under Section 3, not Section 4.71 Therefore, the use of the Section 4(2)
dealer relationships. WILLIAM M. PRIFTI, SECURITIES: PUBLIC & PRIVATE OFFERINGS
§ 1:06-1:07 (1983). "A private offering is the opposite of a public offering." Id.
70. In a recent article, Professor Maynard discussed several cases decided after Gustafson which have denied recovery under § 12(2) in exempt private placements. These decisions relied on Gustafson for the proposition that § 12(2) was narrowed to cover only
public offerings. See Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing Glamorgan Coal
Corp. V. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7581 (RO), 1995 WL 406167 (S.D.N.Y. July 10,
1995)). Professor Maynard, although noting that the Glamorgan opinion was not clear as
to whether the facts involved a private placement made pursuant to § 4(2) or Rule 506 of
Regulation D, observed that the district court opined that "[e]very court since Gustafson,
including this district, has held in light of Gustafson, that § 12(2) applies only to initial
public offerings." Glamorgan, 1995 WL 406167 at *2 (emphasis added). Based on this
analysis, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the § 12(2) claims as they
pertained to private placement offering materials. Id. The court concluded that the private placement memorandum was not a prospectus as used in § 12(2) and stated its reasoning was based on Gustafson's holding "that the term prospectus has the same meaning for
purposes [of] Section 10 and Section 12(2)." Id. at 3 n.3. Professor Maynard also cites
other cases which similarly held that § 12(2) covers only public offerings. Maynard, Impact, supra note at 5, at 67-70 (discussing Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., No.
95-1292, 1995 WL 571397, at *3 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 1995) (excluding private placement
memoranda from § 12(2) since "a 'prospectus' for Section 12(2) purposes includes only
public offerings by issuer or their controlling shareholders") (emphasis added)); ESI Montgomery County, Inc., v. Montenay Int'l Corp., No. 94 Civ 019 (RLC), 1995 WL 547779
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1995) (with regard to the private placement memoranda used in connection with the sale of limited partnership interests, the district court concluded that "[i]n
light of the Supreme Court's clear ruling that [Section] 12(2) covers only public offerings,
private offering memoranda can no longer be considered prospectuses within the meaning
of [Section] 12(2)"); Haerting v. One Toucan Du, Inc., No. Civ. A-94-0142, 1995 WL
244489, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 1995) (where the plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned their
§ 12(2) claims in light of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Gustafson).
71. In other words, authority for the exclusion of § 4(2) offerings from § 12(2) is not
based on the general intent of Gustafson to include only public offerings within § 12(2),
although it is certainly in line with this intent. Instead, it is grounded in the specific language of the case, which provides that a "'prospectus,' absent an overriding exemption
must include the 'information contained in the registration statement."' Section 3-not
§ 4-is considered to be the "overriding exemption." With respect to this language, Professor Bainbridge argues (although he ultimately rejects the position) that since § 12(2)
does not expressly exclude § 4 offerings from its scope, it could be argued that these offerings are included. He posits that Congress only expressly included § 3 offerings within
§ 12(2) because § 3 offerings are exempt from the entire Securities Act, while § 4 offerings
are only exempt from § 5 of the Act. Section 4 offerings would thus be subject to the rest
of the Act, including § 12(2). Professor Bainbridge acknowledges, though, that this argu-
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exemption and its common law requirements to go one step further and
additionally exclude from the scope of Section 12(2) those Section 3 of-

ferings which can also meet this
exemption clearly goes farther than the
72
Court intended in Gustafson.
Despite this, it has been posited that Section 4(2) and its common law
requirements should serve as the appropriate test in determining which
Section 3 offerings are public and which are private. Therefore, using

Section 4(2) in such a way deserves close scrutiny. Upon examination,
several problematic results would occur from such a usage.
First, failure to prove compliance with Section 4(2) and its common law
requirements does not necessarily mean the transaction involved is a pub-

lic offering. An issuer may not be able to meet the burden of proof
needed to demonstrate compliance with Section 4(2)'s requirements, yet
the offering may still be considered private in nature. 73 Second, Section

4(2) exempts offerings from only the registration provision of the Securities Act found in Section 5, not the antifraud provision of Section 12(2).

Therefore, use of a registration exemption to exclude offerings from an
antifraud provision is permitting a usage which was never statutorily in-

ment is weak and agrees that § 4 offerings are excluded. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at
1262-65. See also Weiss, supra note 5, at 1220 (stating that § 4 offerings are excluded from
§ 12(2) simply based on the Court's intent to include only § 3 offerings within the context
of "overriding exemption"). Additionally, Professor Fiflis refers to this exemption
language:
This [exemption language] necessarily implies that offerings exempted from
registration by § 4, on the other hand, are not vulnerable to § 12(2) liability.
Justice Kennedy attempts to state the rule of the case as being that:
[t]he liability imposed by § 12(2) cannot attach unless there is an obligation to distribute the prospectus in the first place (or unless there is an
exemption).
By "exemption" he clearly means only under § 3, not only by virtue of the
necessary implication above, but from the ultimate holding that § 12(2) covers only public offerings by issuers or control persons.
Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 62.
72. Professor Weiss asserts that those § 3 offerings which are also exempt under § 4
(that is, those that can also meet the common law requirements of § 4(2)) should be excluded from § 12(2). Weiss, supra note 5, at 1221. Professor Bainbridge argues against
using § 4(2) in this way, stating that "his approach overlooks the essentially non-public
nature of many exempt transactions." Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1266-67. See infra
notes 73-83 and accompanying text for some of these arguments. This Article is against the
application of § 4(2) in such a way to any § 3 offering, whether the issuer relied on § 4(2) to
begin with as an additional exemption to § 3 or it is applied to the § 3 offering after the fact
to see if it also meets § 4(2)'s requirements.
73. Professor Bainbridge argues:
Although a transaction that qualifies for exemption under Section 4(2) by
definition does not involve a public offering, the converse is not necessarily
true. Professor Weiss ignores the allocation of the burden of proof with respect to exemptions from registration. To say that the defendant failed to
carry its burden of proving that the transaction did not involve any public
offering is not the same as saying the transaction in fact involved a public
offering.
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1266-67.
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tended. 74 Third, compliance with Section 4(2)'s common law requirements may not necessarily be determinative of what is private. Offerings
that may not be able to meet Section 4(2)'s common law requirements

may still be private in nature, yet deemed public under this test. As a
consequence, fundamentally private offerings may be included within
Section 12(2), a result contrary to the express intent in Gustafson.75
Several examples of this odd result are found with respect to Regula-

tion D. Rule 505, which is considered essentially private, has more liberal
requirements than those found in Section 4(2).76 Yet offerings made pursuant to this rule are still viewed as basically private since Rule 505 restricts the number and type of investors and prohibits general
solicitation. 77 Regardless of this, these offerings would be deemed public
merely because of their inability to meet the Section 4(2) requirements
and they would therefore be included within Section 12(2).78

An additional anomaly involves Rule 506 of Regulation D, which was
passed pursuant to Section 4 of the Securities Act with the express intent
to provide a safe harbor to this section. Rule 506 also has more liberal
requirements than Section 4(2)'s common law requirements. 79 Yet again,
failure to meet these requirements would make Rule 506 offerings public.80 Treatment of Rule 506 offerings in such a way would work against
the congressional intent in passing Rule 506-to act as a safe harbor for
private placements. 81
The fourth and final problematic use of Section 4(2) also involves Reg-

ulation D. Regulation D expressly states that any offerings made pursuant to it are not exempt from Section 12(2).82 This statement is
74. Professor Bainbridge stated that "it seems odd that one's compliance with Section
4(2), which on its face exempts the issuer only from Section 5, could determine whether
liability arises not only under Section 12(1), but also under Section 12(2)." Id.
75. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1995). Rule 505 only requires purchasers, not offerees, to
meet certain requirements. Additionally, Rule 505 allows up to 35 non-accredited investors, meeting no requirements. Id. Section 4(2), on the other hand, requires that all offerees and purchasers be sophisticated under § 4(2) as defined in note 79 infra.
77. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1267 referring to Rule 505: "[B]y its terms [it
limits] both the size of the offer and the allowable number of purchasers and also precludes
general advertising and solicitation which gives it most of the key characteristics of a private placement." But see Bloomenthal, Supreme Court, Part2, supra note 5, at 39 (arguing

that since Rule 505 was adopted pursuant to § 3(b) rather than § 4(2), "it is an indicator
that the Commission does not regard it as a private offering").
78. Bloomenthal, Supreme Court, Part2, supra note 5, at 39.

79. Rule 506 does not require offerees to meet investor qualification requirements;
however, § 4(2) does. Additionally, an investor could be accredited for the purposes of
Rule 506 (for example, meeting wealth requirements under Rule 501 of Regulation D) but
not necessarily be sophisticated as required by § 4(2), which requires offerees and purchasers to be knowledgeable about the investment as well as financially sophisticated (able to
bear the risk). As Professor Weiss states: "Court's interpreting Section 4(2) require sellers
to establish the eligibility of all offerees, not merely all purchasers. Thus, liability under
Section 12(2) could attach to a Rule 506 offering where the seller is unable to establish that
all offerees were able to 'fend for themselves."' Weiss, supra note 5, at 1222.
80. See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1267.
81. Id.

82. Professor Weiss admits this is a problem for the SEC, but states:
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substantively true for registration exemptions (that is, those that are
transactional) as a whole, since it recognizes that these exemptions are
not meant to be applied to nor are they used for such a cross-sectional
purpose. Therefore, if Section 4(2) (and its common law requirements) is
used to exclude Rule 505 and 506 offerings from Section 12(2), it not only
indirectly accomplishes what Regulation D expressly prohibits but also
would disregard the general intent of the 1933 Act to confine these exemptions to Section 5.83
B. THE CONCEPT OF "FENDING FOR ONESELF"

What appears to lie behind the proffered application of Section 4(2)
and its common law requirements to Section 3 offerings is in fact an attempt to limit the number of offerings that can truly be excluded from
Section 12(2) as private. 84 No where is this better demonstrated than the
suggested application of Section 4(2) to Rule 506 offerings. Such a use

intimates that the preexisting requirements within Rule 506 are not stringent enough in their protection of investors when faced with the possible
exclusion of these offerings from the antifraud provisions of Section
12(2).85

Section 4(2)'s common law requirements were originally based on the
When the Commission issued Regulation D, it undoubtedly believed that
Section 12(2) applied to all Regulation D offerings. Preliminary Note 1 to
Regulation D represents the SEC's efforts to confirm that all Regulation D
transactions will be subject to the same liability standards. Gustafson now
makes clear that they are not. Section 12(2) applies to some Regulation D
transactions, but not to all.
Weiss, supra note 5, at 1223. Professor Weiss argues that using § 4(2) and its common law
requirements to exempt Regulation D offerings from § 12(2) does not violate the express
mandate that all Regulation D offerings be included. Id. at 1221. He reasons that neither
Preliminary Note 1 nor Regulation D as a whole can have the effect of subjecting to liability under § 12(2) a transaction to which that section would not otherwise apply (that is, a
transaction that does not involve the use of a "prospectus"). Id. Professor Weiss's reasoning assumes, however, that § 4(2) should be allowed to exempt such a transaction when the
arguments against such usage are clearly forceful, as demonstrated in this section of the
Article. Additionally, if § 4(2) were allowed to do this, the spirit of Regulation D's express
inclusion within § 12(2) is also abrogated. Transactional exemptions exempt offerings from
§ 5, not § 12(2).
83. It could be argued that the Court's language including § 3 offerings within § 12(2)
while excluding § 4 offerings from its scope has the same impact of excluding some Regulation D offerings (all 506 offerings) from § 12(2), while others remain. Since Rule 506 was
passed pursuant to § 4, the argument follows that all Rule 506 offerings would be automatically excluded from § 12(2). Professor Bloomenthal argues along these same lines, stating
that for purposes of § 12(2) liability, Rule 506 offerings are clearly private "as the Rule is
an interpretation of § 4(2) of the Securities Act," and thus no § 12(2) liability would attach.
See Bloomenthal, Supreme Court, Part2, supra note 5, at 38. In comparison, § 4(2) and its
common law requirements would have the effect of excluding some Rule 506 offerings on a
case-by-case basis (that is, those that could also comply with it). See Weiss, supra note 5, at
1222-23.
84. Few § 3 offerings (even those which by their nature are considered private) would
satisfy § 4(2) and its common law requirements, since those requirements are very stringent in their application to not only purchasers but also offerees. See supra notes 72-78 and
accompanying text. On the other hand, Regulation D applies only to investors. Id.
85. See infra notes 87 and 89.

194

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

concept founded in the Ralston Purina86 case that if one were able to
"fend for oneself" 87 in an offering, then the full protection of the registration provision of Section 5 was unnecessary, and the issuer could rely on

the private offering exemption in Section 4(2).88 Reliance on Section
4(2)'s requirements for antifraud purposes, however, is imperfect. Fending for oneself under an antifraud section raises concerns other than fending for oneself in a registration setting. Providing adequate disclosure in

some form or another pursuant to a registration exemption does not necessarily insure that this disclosure is truthful, a protection that no exemption-including Section 4(2)-provides. 89

86. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
87. In the Ralston Purina case, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to
enjoin the Ralston Purina Company from making unregistered stock offerings to hundreds
of its employees whom it had designated as "key employees" pursuant to the private offering exemption under § 4(1) (now § 4(2)) of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 120. The
issue in the case was to determine the scope of § 4(2) under the Act. Id. The Court noted
that the Act did not define "public offering" or the scope of § 4(2); however, the Court
observed that the purpose of the Act was to protect investors by promoting full disclosure
of information considered necessary to make an informed decision. Id. The Court stated
that since exempt transactions are those where there is no practical need for full application of the registration provisions of § 5, the applicability of § 4(2) should turn on whether
the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. Id. The Court concluded that "[a]n offering made to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is
a transaction 'not involving any public offering."' Id. (emphasis added). The Court held
that since many of the employees who were offered securities were not "key employees" in
the management sense, but were lower level employees (such as clerical workers, foremen,
and others), it could not be said that the offering was made only to "self-fending" types,
since these types of employees did not have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose. Id. at 127-28. Therefore, the offering was public and § 4(2) did not
apply. Id.
88. Arguing for § 4(2)'s application to § 12(2), Professor Weiss states that § 4(2)'s
"'central teaching' is that to qualify as private, an offering must be made only to persons
who 'can fend for themselves' and who 'have access to the same kind of information."'
Weiss, supra note 5, at 1221.
89. See generally Maynard, Impact, supra note 5. Professor Maynard notes this difference and the inability of § 4(2) alone to provide such protection to those offerings in compliance with this exemption. Id. Professor Maynard argues that since § 12(2) probably
excludes private placements from its coverage under Gustafson, the buyer is left with Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act as the only recourse under the federal law. Id. at 79.
Because of this, Professor Maynard argues that § 12(1) of the Securities Act should be
reinterpreted as providing an alternative remedy. Id. Noting that Ralston Purina required
issuers relying on § 4(2) to establish that all offerees are qualified as self-fending types,
Professor Maynard argues:
In light of Gustafson's holding, one could make a good argument that where
a PPM [private placement memoranda] is used rather than providing access
to such information, the defendant's Section 4(2) exemption should be conditioned on providing all offerees with a truthful and accurate PPM. In other
words, the plaintiff-buyer could argue that the issuer's use of a misleading
PPM creates a Section 5 violation entitling the buyer to relief under Section
12(1).
Id. at 71. Professor Maynard posits that buyers cannot be "self-fending" types under Ralston Purina without having truthful and accurate information, which § 4(2) does not currently require. Id. at 71-72. Although noting that no cases have construed § 4(2) as
requiring this, Professor Maynard cites SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082,
1096-1100 (2d Cir. 1972), which held that there was a § 5 violation in the case of a false and
misleading material statement in a registered offering. The court held that § 5 required not
only the delivery of a prospectus satisfying the § 10(a) requirements, but also implicit in
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What is correct, therefore, about any reference to Section 4(2) is not
the use of its common law requirements to determine which Section 3

offerings should be excluded from Section 12(2), but rather the use of the
concept upon which it is grounded-that of being able to "fend for one-

self'-as the determinative factor for establishing who needs protection
under Section 12(2). Application of this concept to Section 12(2) is not
only appropriate but called for since the concept prevails throughout the
Securities Act. 90

Therefore, reliance on Section 4(2) and its common law requirements
stops with Section 5.91 Reference should be made once again to the Ralston Purinacase in order to establish new requirements for determining

who are "self-fending" types for the purpose of ascertaining which92Section 3 offerings should be excluded from Section 12(2)'s coverage.

this was the delivery of a truthful document. Professor Maynard argues that this implication would be extended to private placement memoranda through § 12(1). Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 72-74.
90. See generally Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 127. See also supra notes 88-89 for a

discussion of applying the "self-fending concept" to § 12(2). See also Maynard, Impact,
supra note 5, at 71.
91. Section 4(2) does not require truthful disclosure, a factor which § 12(2) mandates.
Therefore, if § 4(2) cannot ensure truthful disclosure for its own offerings, it cannot possibly provide such to those § 3 offerings that can also comply with it. Additionally, as Professor Maynard argues, it is not likely that § 12(1) will be used to ensure this protection for
offerings exempted under § 4(2). See Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 72-73. Professor
Maynard admits that the use of a non-antifraud section such as § 12(1) to enforce the
truthfulness of a document ignores the structure of the Securities Act and has been heavily
criticized. Id. She additionally notes that no case other than Manor Nursing Ctrs. has
implied such a condition under § 5, and no cases have implied such a condition with respect
to § 12(1). Id.
92. Some commentators have mentioned the necessity for revisiting the Ralston
Purina case because of the problems associated with the Gustafson decision. See, e.g.,
Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 66-67, arguing that the Court implicitly recognized Ralston Purina and, necessarily, the concept upon which that case is based: "Although the
Court made no mention of how to define a 'public offering,' it referred to the concept in
the context of registration and, therefore, the test of SEC v. Ralston-Purina Co., 345 U.S.
119 (1953), must apply." But Professor Fiflis further observed:
[I]t is clear that the majority in Gustafson did not have Ralston-Purina
clearly in mind, because the opinion refers to an understanding of public
offerings as involving 'widespread' offerings and offerings 'to the public at
large'; and refers to prospectuses as being documents 'of wide dissemination.'
This naivete about the concept of a public offering is the insecure foundation
of the Court's opinion. This may presage an overruling of Ralston Purina as
a further insult to legislative intent, but until that occurs Ralston Purina must
be taken as the determinant of a public offering.
Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 67. See Maynard, Impact, supra note 5, at 70-74 for the
proposition that the long-standing concept of public offerings, based on Ralston-Purinaand
its progeny has been called into question, if not jeopardized altogether by the Court's rea-

soning in Gustafson. See also ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp.,

where the court observed that whether an offering was public or private would be based on
the criteria in the Ralston Purina case and its progeny. ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v.
Montenay Int'l Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1061, 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The court stated that the
relevant factors to be considered in such a determination depended upon "(1) the number
of offerees; (2) the sophistication of the offerees; and (3) the manner of the offering." Id.
Application of these factors was not called for in the case since the plaintiff had not alleged
that the offering was public, but had conceded that the memoranda used in the offerings
were "private placement memoranda." Id.
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V. THE TEST
Towards this end, at least two categories of "self-fending" types could
be used to form the new test for determining which Section 3 offerings
are private and therefore not covered by Section 12(2). The first category
focuses on the preexisting relationship that offerees and purchasers have
with the issuer, while the second category relates to the ability of offerees
93
and purchasers to contractuallyprotect themselves in the offering.
A. Two
1.

CATEGORIES

Insiders

With respect to the first category, since Section 12(2) requires that prospectuses covered thereby provide truthful disclosure, then those offerees

and purchasers who are in a position to ascertain the truthfulness of such
information would be able to "fend for themselves." Most likely, this

category of "self-fending" type would be insiders of the issuer, such as
executive officers, directors, general partners of the issuer of the securities being offered or sold, or any directors, executive officers, or general

partners of a general partner of that issuer. 94 These types of individuals

are in management roles and are in a position to know the inner-workings of the issuer. Therefore, they are best able to judge the veracity of
93. Commentators have generally agreed that the concept of "self-fending" for § 12(2)
purposes should include both offerees and purchasers. See Maynard, Impact, supra note 5,
at 85. See also Fiflis, Significant, supra note 5, at 68, arguing that Rule 506 offerings may be
public and even offerees may have to be self-fending for purposes of Rule 506:
Even Rule 506 of Reg. D (the private offering safe harbor) may involve a
"public offering" because an exempt 506 offering may be made to an unlimited number of accredited investors, some of whom (such as a wealthy young
athlete or a naive heir to a million dollar inheritance) may not be able to
"fend for themselves." Rule 506 by its terms is expressly limited to exemption from registration, so that a seller defending against a § 12(2) action
could not claim that § 19(a) also exempts the transaction from § 12(2).
Further, the Rule 506 exemption from registration goes beyond Ralston
Purina in another respect because it does not require all offerees to be able
to fend for themselves. It refers only to purchasers. Of course those who fail
to register, relying in good faith on Rule 506, are protected by § 19 for that
failure. But because Rule 506 exempts only from registration,not civil liability
otherwise, and therefore, if in fact the offering is to some who cannotfend for
themselves, it is public, there should be no protection against § 12(2) liability.

Id. (emphasis added).
94. This category is taken from Rule 501(a)(4) of Regulation D. The definition of
executive officer is also provided by Rule 501(f) of Regulation D, which defines "executive
officer" as:
[T]he president, any vice president in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer
who performs a policy making function, or any other person who performs
similar policy making functions for the issuer. Executive officers of subsidiaries may be deemed executive officers of the issuer if they perform such
policymaking functions for the issuer.
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(f) (1995).
Professor Loss states: "Similarly, the Commission staff has recognized the executive officer of the parent of a Regulation D issuer may perform a policymaking function for its
subsidiary and be deemed an 'executive officer' of the subsidiary." Loss, FUNDAMENTALS,
supra note 12, at 317.
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any statement made about the issuer, and any other statements in the
prospectus. In fact, many insiders work with the issuer's counsel in the
preparation of the prospectus and provide, on some level, the information used in the prospectus.
Even if the issuer distributed prospectuses to non-insiders and provided all of these individuals with access to corporate files and informa-

tion, this would still not ensure protection under Section 12(2). The
amount of information given is irrelevant. Non-insiders are not in a position to effectively assess the truthfulness of such information since they
lack the necessary two tools to do so-(1) internal knowledge about the
issuer and (2) experience therewith. Only those two tools provide the
necessary basis upon which all other information can be compared and

measured for its veracity. This statement remains true no matter how
knowledgeable non-insiders are about the type of investment offered and/

or how financially sophisticated they are (that is, able to bear the risk).
Both of these types of sophistication do not provide the necessary sophistication about the issuer that comes only from the knowledge and experience gained from managing the issuer. Only an insider position provides
this. This insider category must be applied, however, in such a way that
form does not overcome substance. If certain individuals are insiders
only by virtue of their title, then this requirement would not be met.
2.

Contractually Sophisticated

The second category of the "self-fending" type would be offerees and
purchasers who are able to enter into arm's-length private negotiations
with the issuer, and who can ultimately condition any purchase of securities on obtaining written contractual provisions that afford the same protection that Section 12(2) would normally provide. 95 An example of this
would be the plaintiffs in Gustafson who had negotiated with the sellers
for warranties and representations in the private written sales contract
that in effect fully protected them without the necessity of seeking protec-

tion under Section 12(2).96 This category of "self-fending" type would be
95. An arm's-length transaction assumes there is no undue influence, duress, or other
contractual heavy-handedness, so that the parties entering into the contract can freely bargain for the necessary protections.
96. See Bancroft, supra note 5, at 188 n.245, agreeing that the purchasers were "selffending" types:
An argument can be made for narrowing the Gustafson case to its facts, as
the Court appeared to do here. The Buyers in this case were sophisticated
and had fully researched the company before purchasing it. Gustafson, 115
S. Ct. at 1064-65. They evidenced their sophistication when they insisted on a
remedial clause in the Agreement, and were fully compensated pursuant to
this clause. Id. at 1065. Thus there was no need to apply § 12(2) to the Agreement, because the plaintiffs had already received full compensation. In future
cases, however, with less sophisticated buyers, there may be a need to impose
§ 12(2) liability when the buyers could not otherwise be compensated.
Id. (emphasis added).
Professor Weiss raises a possible argument in support of these types of individuals being
excluded from § 12(2): "The facts of Gustafson thus made it clear that one consequence of
a holding that Section 12(2) applies to private negotiated sales of stock would be to pre-
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those who are deemed to be "contractually sophisticated." Unlike Section 4(2)'s sophistication requirement, this type of sophistication would
be based on objective criteria since it is easy to ascertain whether contractual provisions will be fully protective.
B.

THE APPLICATION

A test is only as good as its successful application. Therefore, one of
the primary advantages of both categories of this new test is that they
provide a bright-line rule for issuers. In comparison, Section 4(2) would
be applied on a case-by-case basis and, as a result, gives issuers little
comfort.

97

With respect to the new test's application to Regulation D, Rule 504
offerings (offerings to unlimited numbers of investors without regard to
investor qualification) would be considered to be public under Section
12(2) unless all of the offerees and purchasers were self-fending types
under either category as provided by the test. 98 Rule 505 offerings would
likewise be treated the same. These offerings would be public unless all
offerees and purchasers could meet either prong of the new test. Offerees and purchasers meeting the accredited investor definition of Rule
501(a)(4) would automatically be "self-fending" types under the new test.
Those who are accredited by virtue of some other definition under Rule
501(a) (such as being able to meet income, net worth, qualified entity, or
other requirements) would only be self-fending for the purposes of Section 12(2) if they were able to qualify under the second category of the
clude sophisticated parties to such transactions from structuring their obligations as they
deemed fit." Weiss, supra note 5, at 1211.
97. Professor Bainbridge notes that the current status of determining which § 3 offerings are included within § 12(2) leads to a case-by-case approach. Additionally, the applicability of § 4(2) as the test would lead to the same result. He argues that, as the law
currently stands, there is much uncertainty which would be the same if § 4(2) (and its
common law requirements) were used.
On the other hand the majority's statement 'that a document is not a prospectus ... if, absent an exemption it need not comply with § 10's requirements in the first place,' seems to call for a case-by-case analysis of whether a
particular document would be required to comply with Section 10. So too
does the already noted statement that 'prospectus under Section 10 is confined to documents related to a public offering'.
If it turns out that a case-by-case analysis is necessary, as I suspect it will,
sorting out the answers to these questions will not produce closure. Instead,
issuers and affiliates often will be deprived of the predictability and ex ante
certainty that promotes liquidity because it is possible a court would determine, with the benefit of hindsight, that their transaction involved a public
offering. The inherently vague 'common law' standards applicable under
Section 4(2), if adopted as the means for determining whether a public offering is involved, will further compound the problem by adding even greater
uncertainty. All of this, of course, merely serves to illustrate further the
problems created by the majority's approach to statutory interpretation and
the significance of the ambiguities created by the majority opinion.
Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 1268.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1995).
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new test. 99
The same approach would apply to Rule 506.100 Rule 506 offerings

would be covered under Section 12(2) unless all of the offerees and purchasers are self-fending types under either prong. Accredited individuals
or entities in a Rule 506 offering would be treated in the same manner
under the new test as a Rule 505 offering. Being "sophisticated" as defined by Rule 506 would be irrelevant since this term does not comport
with either category of self-fending types.' 0 ' Other Section 3 offerings

(such as offerings made pursuant to Rule 147, Section 3(a)(11), Section
3(a)(9), Section 3(a)(10), Regulation A, or Rule 701) would be public

unless all offerees and purchasers are "self-fending types" under the new
2
10

test.
Needless to say, the application of the new test would cause most Section 3 offerings to be included within Section 12(2). However, this is in
line with the inherent difficulty of being self-fending for antifraud purposes. To this extent, the test may be somewhat in sync with Gustafson's
generic definition of public offerings since offerings to large groups of
people (that is, those involving the wide dissemination of the prospectus)
would probably not involve self-fending types only. The categories of the
new test are by their nature self-limiting due to their difficulty of
qualification.
Besides providing a bright-line test, another advantage flows from its
application. The test obviates the use of non-determinative factors, like
the number of investors, the dissemination of documents, or whether the
offering has met its exemption requirements for Section 5 purposes. This
is because the test's focus is truly based on the one factor that countswho needs protection under Section 12(2).
VI.

CONCLUSION

At some future point in time, the Court will be faced with resolving the
issue raised by this Article. If the Court returns to the Ralston Purina
99. This refers to the accredited investor definitions under Rule 501(a)(1)-(8), excluding Rule 501(a)(1)(4). It is recognized that the term investor under Regulation D means
purchaser; however, for § 12(2) antifraud purposes, the two categories of the new test include offerees. Section 12(2) strives to ensure the truthfulness of a prospectus, whether or
not parties actually purchase. See also supra notes 79 and 93 and accompanying text in
support of this.
100. Determining that Rule 505 and 506 offerings are public in some instances for purposes of § 12(2) is not necessarily in conflict with prior statements in this Article stating
that those offerings are essentially private. The term "public" with regards to §§ 5 and
12(2) rests on the same fundamental test of who is "self-fending" yet varies in application
since each section speaks to different concerns in the disclosure process.
101. Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) allows up to 35 sophisticated investors each of whom, either
alone or with a purchaser's representative, has sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to be capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment. See Sec. Act Rel. 6825 43 SEC Dock. 704-707 (1989) (amendment).
102. With respect to Rule 144 and Rule 144A, both offerings are automatically excluded from § 12(2) as types of resale transactions and, therefore, secondary market transactions. See Weiss, supra note 5, at 1224-25. Application of the new self-fending test to
these offerings would be unnecessary since they are already excluded under Gustafson.
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case and embraces the concept of being able to "fend for oneself' for
purposes of Section 12(2), then a new test based upon this concept should
be developed for excluding Section 3 offerings from Section 12(2)'s scope.
Whether or not the Court adopts the specific test posited by this Article
and/or adds categories of "self-fending" types, this Article underscores
the dubious application of Section 4(2) (and its common law requirements) to resolve the issue.

